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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(j) (1953 as amended)
for the reason that this matter was transferred to the Utah Court
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court,
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

Standard

waive

its

right

to

interpose

statute of frauds as a defense to the oral agreement

the

to pay

$1,000 per month for the third 36-month period of the written
lease as a result of Standard's admission in its pleadings and at
trial that it agreed to pay $1,000 per month?
2.

Did the lower court err by failing

to conclude

that the written lease and Standard's written checks dated October 20, 1988, and December 1, 1988, were insufficient to satisfy
the statute of frauds?
3.

Did the trial court err by failing

to conclude

that English's change of the lock on October 18, 1988, precludes
English from enforcing Standard's agreement to pay rent?
4.

Is the trial court's conclusion that English is

entitled to damages for repairs and renovations made to the premises correct?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a landlord/tenant dispute.

The case

was tried in the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on
December 21 and 22, 1989.

At the conclusion of the trial, Judge

Murphy took the case under advisement, after which he ruled in
favor of English.

The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law and a Judgment on or about February 9, 1990.
May

17, 1990, the Court

entered

Motion to Amend the Judgment.

an Order

denying

On

Standard's

Standard filed a Notice of Appeal

on June 7, 1990.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1974, plaintiff/respondent Dr. Daniel English

("English") constructed a building located at 3525 Market Street,
West Valley City, Utah (the "Leased Premises"), to be occupied by
defendant/appellant Standard Optical Co. ("Standard") as the tenant.

See Trial Transcript ("Transcript"), Vol. I, p. 60-61.
2.

Standard took possession of the building and con-

tinuously occupied it as the tenant under the lease dated May 21,
1973 (Trial Exhibit 3 ) , and a subsequent lease dated August 10,
1982 (the "Lease") (Trial Exhibit 4 ) .
pp. 60, 61, 65.
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See Transcript, Vol. I,

3.

Until June, 1989, Standard was the only tenant to

ever occupy the Leased Premises.

See Trial Exhibits 3 and 4;

Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 60-61, 65.
4.

Significant portions of the Lease are stated as

follows:
(a) To have and to hold said premises
and office space under the terms of this
agreement for a term of ten (10) years beginning on the first day of the month following
written notice to lessee from lessor and terminating at midnight on the last day of the
same month 10 years hence [i.e. 1992].
(b) The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for the demised
premises and to lessor, or order, at West
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum
of $1,000 each month for 36 months with the
first such installment to be due and payable
on or before the first day of September,
1982, and each installment payment to be due
thereafter on or before the same calendar day
during the term of the Agreement.
A grace
period of five days is given for the making
of such installment payment.
(c) The monthly rent specified in the
section above shall be negotiated every 36
months.
(d) It
is mutually
understood
and
agreed by these parties that the demised premises herein will be used by the lessee as a
retail optical business and lessee does
hereby agree to use said premises for no
other purpose without the written consent of
lessor first had and obtained. However, such
consent will not be unreasonably withheld.
(e) It
is mutually
understood
and
agreed that the premises herein leased are in
a condition of excellent repair . . . .
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(f) The Lessee does hereby agree to at
all times during the term of this agreement
keep the heating and air conditioning units
in a condition of good repair.
(g) The Lessee
hereby
accepts
the
Leased Premises in a condition of good repair
and does hereby agree to at all times during
the term of this agreement to maintain the
interior of the demised premises and to keep
the same in a condition of good repair at all
times, and agrees not to make any alterations
to the demised premises without the written
consent of the lessor first had and obtained,
and then that all such alterations shall be
made at the sole expense of the Lessee and
that any such alterations as are then made a
part of or attached to the building shall
remain with the premises and become the property of the Lessor at the end of this lease
term.
See Trial Exhibit 4 (emphasis added).
5.

In September, 1985, the parties negotiated a rent

increase from $1,000 to $1,200 per month pursuant to the terms of
paragraph (c) of the Lease for the second 36 month period of the
Lease term.
6.

See R. at 189 (Findings of Fact, 1 3 ) .
In 1986 and 1987, Standard made the decision to

convert its optical stores to "superstores" where possible, and
in early 1988 began negotiations with Valley Fair Mall, located
one block away from the Leased Premises.

In June, 1988, Standard

executed a lease with Valley Fair Mall for a superstore in the
mall.

See R. at 189 (Findings of Fact, U 4 ) .
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7.
provided

Despite the fact that the written Lease expressly

for a ten-year

lease term

(and thus would expire in

1992), prior to June, 1988, Standard understood the Lease term to
expire at the end of August, 1988, with an option to negotiate a
renewal*

See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, 11 6).
8.

On June 20, 1988, Klaus Rathke ("Rathke"), general

manager of Standard, told English that Standard was moving the
optical store located in the Leased Premises to the Valley Fair
Mall.

English informed Standard that the term of the Lease did

not expire in 1988.
9.

See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, I 7 ) .

Paragraph (c) of the Lease provides that the par-

ties would negotiate a rental amount every 36 months.
36-month period concluded on August 31, 1988.

The second

See Trial Exhibit

4.
10.

On or about June 30, 1988, Standard proposed to

sublease the Leased Premises.

English responded in writing that

he would consider a proposal to sublease the Leased Premises.
See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, 1f 8).
11.

On July 5, 1988, English requested that Standard

submit a list of proposed tenants for subletting the Leased Premises and suggested a meeting on September 15, 1988, to negotiated a new rental amount.

See R. at 190

1 10).
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(Findings of Fact,

12.

July 17, 1988, was Standard's last day of business

at the Leased Premises,
13.

On

or

See R. at 191 (Findings of Fact, 1f 11).

about July

18, 1988, Standard moved

its

records and

inventory from the Leased Premises and also moved

attachments

to

the

building,

including

built-in

cabinets

counters in violation of Paragraph (g) of the Lease.

and

See R. at

191 (Findings of Fact, 11 12), Trial Exhibit 4.
14.

Several large signs were placed on the Leased Pre-

mises stating that Standard had moved.

See R. at 191 (Findings

of Fact, 1 12).
15.

By letter, dated July 20, 1988, Standard informed

English that Standard had abandoned its plans to have a subsidiary of Standard sublet the Leased Premises but that Standard
still wanted to sublet the premises to someone else.

See R. at

191 (Findings of Fact, 1f 13).
16.

In its July 20, 1988 letter, Standard further sug-

gested "an outright buyout of the lease."
17.

See Trial Exhibit 7.

On July 22, 1988, English wrote Standard stating

that he needed to know more about the proposed subtenant before
he could give his approval.

See R. at 191 (Findings of Fact,

1 14).
18.

On August 1, 1988, Standard wrote English stating

that Standard intended to negotiate for an $800 per month rent

-6-

amount beginning September 1, 1988.

Alternatively, Standard pro-

posed a buy out of the Lease for $4,800 to be paid on September
15, 1988.

Se£ R. at 191 (Findings of Fact, 11 16).
19.

On

September

26,

1988,

Stephen

Schubach

("Schubach"), president of Standard, Rathke and English met to
discuss the lease.

English suggested that if Standard wanted to

sublease, they should consider calling Weight Watchers.

Schubach

declared, "We're not in the leasing business, you are.

Our busi-

ness is the optical business."

See R. at 192 (Findings of Fact,

11 17).
20.

English left the September 26, 1988, meeting with

the understanding that Standard was not going to use the Leased
Premises as a retail optical shop and that English was responsible for finding a tenant for the Leased Premises and that the
parties would continue to negotiate a rent amount.

See R. at 192

(Findings of Fact, 1 18).
21.
Standard.

No

subtenant

was

ever

presented

to English

by

Standard's only effort toward obtaining a subtenant

was to call

and

leave a message

for Rick Trentman

of Weight

Watchers who English had previously suggested that Standard call.
See R. at 193 (Findings of Fact H 22).
22.

In compliance with his understanding that he was

responsible for finding a tenant, English had an access key made
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for the Leased Premises on September 29, 1988, and upon entering
the premises to inspect them, English found damage to the premises.

See R. at 192 (Findings of Fact, 1f 19).
23.

On October 18, 1988, English changed the lock to

the premises for the purpose of protecting

the tools of the

repairmen who would be working on the premises.

See R. at 193

(Findings of Fact, 1f 23).
24.

On October 20, 1988, Standard issued a check in

the sum of $1,600, the check stub indicating that $800 was for
September's rent and $800 was for October.

See R. at 193 (Find-

ings of Fact, 1 24).
25.

English subsequently returned the $1,600 check to

Standard because the parties had not yet agreed on a rent amount.
See R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, 1f 26).
26.

During the first week of November, 1988, Schubach

called English at his home and agreed that Standard would pay
$1,000 per month rent.
27.

See R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, 11 28).

Each time Standard sought access to the premises

after the lock was changed, access was achieved.

See R. at 194

(Findings of Fact, 1 29).
28.

On or about November

7, 1988, English 1 s office

gave the key to the premises to an employee of Standard.
at 194 (Findings of Fact, 11 30).
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See R.

29.

Between September lf 1988, and January 31, 1989,

Standard only attempted to enter the Leased Premises on November
5 or 7, 1988, the first part of October, 1988, November 4, 1988,
and December

16, 1988.

Standard was not denied access on any

occasion it attempted to enter the Leased Premises.

English's

actions never deprived Standard of access to the premises.

See

R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, 1f 32).
30.

There is nothing in the record to show that Stan-

dard ever complained or was concerned about any alleged lack of
possession until it filed an Answer to the Complaint.
31.

On November

21, 1988, English

received back the

$1,600 check, with the check stub notations changed to indicate
that $1,000 was for September's rent and the remaining $600 was
to be applied as a partial payment for October's rent.

See R. at

195 (Findings of Fact, 1 34).
32.

On November 21, 1988, Standard paid Utah Power and

Light for electricity supplied to the Leased Premises up through
October 18, 1988.
33.

See R. at 195 (Findings of Fact, 11 35).

On December 5, 1988, English received a check from

Standard for rent in the sum of $1,000.
of Fact, 1f 37).
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See R. at 195 (Findings

34.
Light

On December 6, 1988, Standard paid Utah Power and

for electricity

November 18, 1988.
35.

supplied

to the Leased

Premises

through

See R. at 195 (Findings of Fact, U 38),

In the Lease, Standard represents and agrees, on

three separate occasions, regarding the condition of the premises
at the beginning of the lease term:
It is mutually understood and agreed
that the premises herein leased are in a condition of excellent repair . . .
Trial Exhibit 4 (p. 2 ) .
Lessee hereby accepts the Leased Premises in a condition of good repair . . .
Trial Exhibit 4 (p. 2 ) .
The Lessee does hereby agree to accept
the demised premises in a state of good
repair . . .
Trial Exhibit 4 (p. 3 ) .
36.

Standard

failed to maintain the premises at all

times in a clean and sanitary condition in accordance with good
and reasonable standards of like commercial units.

See R. at 196

(Findings of Fact, 11 39).
37.

Standard removed attachments from the building and

failed to maintain the furnace in a reasonable state of repair.
See R. at 196 (Findings of Fact, 11 40, 41).
38.

English's and English's contractors' inspection of

the premises revealed that it was reasonably necessary to repair
-10-

the following items which English did repair at a reasonable cost
as follows:
(a)
plumbing

The furnace was not working properly and the

was damaged.

Willard

Hellstrom

charged

$619.86

for

repairs.
(b)

Standard

had

removed

numerous

including books built-in cabinets and counters.

fixtures,

The removal left

large and small holes in the walls and damaged the ceiling, walls
and carpets.

Also, the removal of the built-in cabinets left

gaps in the trim.

Additionally, Standard had failed to fix a

plumbing leak which had damaged the bathroom walls, cabinets and
left the floor tiles curling.

The damage to the walls, ceiling

and bathroom trim was repaired with like materials.
for those repairs were:

The bills

Gordon Hellstrom, $2,031.82; Butterfield

Lumber, $366.42; Fred Burns, $4,142.30; Perschon, $113.99; and
Perschon, $1,472.01.
(c)

Standard left behind damaged

light fixtures

requiring repair of 34 lamp holders, replacement of 120 lamps and
other repairs by Willard Hellstrom totalling $1,135.26.
(d)

The

above

repairs

totalled

$9,852.66

English substantially paid on or before December 31, 1988.
R. at 196-97 (Findings of Fact, 11 42).
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which
See

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It

is not clear

from Standard's

Brief

of Appellant

("Appellant's Brief") which findings of fact and conclusions of
law Standard challenges an appeal.

Standard appears to argue

that the lower court should have entered a conclusion of law that
the parties1 agreement to reduce the rent from $1,200 to $1,000
per month for the third

36-month period of the lease term is

unenforceable as a matter of law because the writings that discuss it are insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.

How-

ever, admissions of the rent agreement made by Standard in its
pleadings and at trial bar Standard from interposing the statute
of frauds as a shield to liability.

Even

if the statute of

frauds were to apply, the statute is satisfied by the Lease, the
rent checks and check stubs written by Standard, and the parties'
written correspondence, together with the parties1 trial testimony that they had agreed on a rent amount.
Standard claims that English unlawfully evicted Standard when English changed the lock to the Leased Premises.

How-

ever, English did not enter the premises or change the lock until
after Standard had moved out of the premises and directed English
to

obtain

a subtenant.

Standard's

instruction

to obtain

a

subtenant effectively authorized English to enter the premises to
repair them so that they could be shown to prospective tenants.
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Furthermore, the lower court found that English's actions never
deprived Standard
time

Standard

changed

the

of access to the Leased Premises; that each

sought

lock

for

access,

it

the purpose

was

achieved;

that

of protecting

English

the workmen's

tools; and that Standard was given a key to the new lock, all
findings which are unchallenged by Standard on appeal.
Finally, Standard contends that English is not entitled
to recover the amounts he expended in repairing and refurbishing
the premises on the grounds that there was no evidence adduced at
trial of the condition of the premises at the commencement of the
lease term.

On the contrary, the Lease itself, executed by Stan-

dard, recites in three different places that the Leased Premises
were in a condition of "good" and/or

f,

excellentn repair.

More-

over, having been directed by Standard to obtain a subtenant and
with Standard being in breach of its rent agreement, English had
a duty to mitigate
rent.

the damages

caused

by the accruing unpaid

The leading case of Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Com-

pany, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), mandates that landlords take commercially
recovery

reasonable
of

the

steps

reasonable

to

relet

costs

incurred in reletting the premises.
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of

premises
repairs

and
and

authorizes
refurbishing

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Standard has not specifically identified which findings

of fact it challenges on appeal.

A review of Standard's Appel-

lant's Brief suggests that Standard has not expressly assigned
err to any of the findings.

To the extent that any of Standard's

arguments impliedly contests any of the trial court's findings of
fact, those findings shall not be set aside on appeal, unless
Standard satisfies the requirements of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Governing findings entered by the trial court, Rule 52,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in part as follows:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a finding

is "clearly

erroneous" only where it is "against the clear weight of the evidence" or where the appellate court otherwise reaches "a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

State v.

Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Special Service District 1
v. Jackson Cattle, 744 P.2d

1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).

A trail

court's findings should be affirmed where they are supported by

-14-

substantial evidence.

See Jackson Cattle, 744 P.2d at 1377.

The

Utah Supreme Court, quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971), has stated:
"The appellate court. . .does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo.
The mere
fact that on the same evidence the appellate
court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting the findings
aside.
It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law."
Walker, 743 P. 2d at 193 (emphasis added).
Omaha

Insurance

explained

that

Co.,
for

776

P.2d

an appellant

896

In Reid v. Mutual of

(Utah

1989),

the

court

to challenge a trial court's

findings of fact, the appellant:
must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support
the findings even viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below.
Reid, 776 P.2d at 899.
In its appeal, Standard

also has not directly chal-

lenged any of trail court's conclusions of law or at least has
not identified which conclusions it contends are erroneous.

Nev-

ertheless, this Court is not bound by the lower court's conclusions of law and reviews them for correctness.

City of West Jor-

dan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988).
A trail court's conclusions of law, if correct, will be affirmed

-15-

on any grounds even if they are different from those stated by
the trial court.

See Foss Lewis & Sons Construction Co. v. Gen-

eral Insurance Co. of America, 517 P.2d 539, 540 (Utah 1973).
II.

STANDARD'S ADMISSION OF THE RENT AGREEMENT IN ITS PLEADINGS
AND AT TRIAL BARS STANDARD FROM RELYING ON THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AS A DEFENSE TO LIABILITY.
Standard seeks to use the statute of frauds

to shield

itself from liability for the lease payments which accrued after
September 1, 1988.

Standard argues that the writings that dis-

cuss the parties1 agreement to pay $lf000 rent are insufficient
to satisfy that statute of frauds.

Historically, the statute of

frauds was designed to protect property owners from the fictitious claims of supposed transferees.

However, the underlying

purpose of the statute of frauds is satisfied where both parties
admit

the

terms

of

the

alleged

oral

agreement.

Failure

to

enforce an agreement under these circumstances would result in
the same injustice the statute of frauds is intended to prevent.
Consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute
is the rule that a party who seeks to avoid enforcement of an
oral agreement waives its right to rely on the statute of frauds

1

Utahfs statute of frauds relating to leases and contracts
for interest in lands, Utah Code Ann. S 25-5-3 (1989), provides
as follows: "Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year . . . shall be void unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease . . . is to be made. . . . n
-16-

as a defense to the agreement where that party has admitted the
terms of the agreement.

The Utah Supreme Court recognized this

rule in Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984).
In Bentlev, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
had orally agreed to guarantee a corporation's obligation to purchase

a truck

admitted

from

the plaintiffs.

At

trial, the defendant

that at the time he signed the bill of sale for the

truck on behalf of the corporate buyer, he intended and understood that he was a guarantor of the debt.
In determining whether the defendant should be held to
his oral promise to guarantee the debt, the court stated:
The statute of frauds is a defense that can
be waived by . . . admitting its existence in
the pleadings [citations omitted]; or admitting at trial the existence and all essential
terms of the contract [citations omitted].
Bentley,

694

P.2d

at

621.

On

the basis

of

the defendant's

in-court admission, the Court in Bentley held that the defendant
had waived the statute of frauds as a defense and accordingly was
bound by his promise to guarantee the debt despite the fact that
it was not in writing as required by the statute of frauds.
The court reasoned as follows:
Since a purpose of the statute of frauds is
to prevent fraud and perjury on the part of
one claiming that another had guaranteed a
debt, the one opposing the claim cannot complain if he admits the existence of the guarantee. [Citations omitted.] "It cannot give
a court any great satisfaction to permit a
-17-

Id.

defendant to escape from performing a contract he admits he has made."
2 Corbin on
Contracts S 320 at 153 (1950).
id.
In the instant case, Standard has admitted the existence of an oral agreement for lease payments of $1,000 per month
both in its pleadings and at trial.

In its Trial Brief, dated

December 15, 1989, Standard asserts in paragraph 22 of the Statement of Facts as follows:
22.
On or about November 2, 1988,
Stephen Schubach called Dr. English at his
home and proposed that Standard Optical pay
$1,000 a month for the Premises.
R. at 94.

The trial testimony of Stephen Schubach, President of

Standard, confirms the statement made by Standard
Brief.

in its Trial

Schubach testified at trial that during the conversation

which took place on or about November 2f 1988, he agreed to pay
$1,000.

See Transcript, Vol. II, p. 194, line 20-22.

Further

confirming Schubach's testimony, English testified at trial that
Schubach called English at his home on or about November 2, 1988,
and agreed to $1,000 as the rental figure.

See Transcript, Vol.

I, pp. 139-40.
While Standard admits in its Trial Brief and Schubach
testified

at trial that Schubach

called English and agreed to

$1,000 per month as rent, Standard suggests in its brief that the
agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent may have been an agreement
-18-

only for the period until a new tenant was obtained.
lant's Brief at 19.

See Appel-

There is, however, a complete absence of

support in the record for the assertion that the agreement to pay
$1,000 per month

rent

occurred

in any context

other

than an

agreement to pay $1,000 per month for the third 36-month period
of the Lease.

At

no place in his deposition or trial testimony

did Schubach assert that Standard's agreement to pay $1,000 per
month rent was not in the context of the negotiations for a rent
amount under the lease.

At no place in his deposition or trial

testimony did Schubach assert that the agreement to pay $1,000
per month rent was in the context of a settlement.
Moreover, the trial court found that Standard agreed to
pay $1,000 per month for the premises.

Standard has not chal-

lenged and this Court must accept that finding.

Additionally,

and as discussed below in Argument III, the parties' trial testimony regarding their negotiations and the parties' correspondence
during

those negotiations

establish that

2

the agreement

to pay

While the evidence establishes that the agreement to pay
$1,000 per month rent was for the third 36-month period of the
lease term, it should be noted that the damages awarded by the
trial court equal the amount suggested by Standard, i.e., $7,400
which represents the amount of unpaid rent which accrued prior to
the date English leased the premises to another tenant (appr
mately seven and one-half months).
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$1,000 per month rent related to the third 36-month period of the
lease term.
III. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS RECOVERY.
A.

The Cases Cited by Standard do not Govern the Facts of
This Case.
In its brief, Standard cites a number of cases for the

proposition

that leases providing

for the negotiation of rent

with no specified method of determining the amount are unenforceable.

Each case cited by Standard

is distinguishable

in that

none of the parties involved in those cases actually agreed on a
rent

amount

and

made

payments

pursuant

Accordingly, those cases do not govern.

to

that

agreement.

However, because Stan-

dard places special emphasis on Pinqree v. Continental Group of
Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976), it is useful examine that
case for its applicability to the case at bar.
Pinqree involves a lease which expressly granted the
tenant two options to renew for two five-year terms upon the same
terms

and

conditions

as

the original

rental amount would be renegotiated.

lease, except

that

the

As pointed out by Standard

in its brief, the parties were unable to agree upon a rent amount
for the renewal period.

Pinqree, 558 P.2d at 1321.

Because the

parties could not agree on a rent, the Utah Supreme Court in
Pinqree refused to fix a reasonable rent.
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id.

Standard contends

that Pinqree governs the facts of this case and requires the conclusion that the Lease is not enforceable because the parties
failed to agree on a rent amount after September 1, 1988.
Standard's analysis of Pinqree entirely disregards the
trial

court's

finding

of

fact, unchallenged

on

English and Standard did agree on a rent amount.

appeal, that
See R. at 194

(Finding of Fact, 1f 28). Standard also disregards the undisputed
fact that the parties' agreement

for a $1,000 per month rent

amount was memorialized by Trial Exhibits 17 and 18, Standard's
two written rent checks, and Trial Exhibit 13, English's signed
letter.

Accordingly, Pinqree and the other cases cited by Stan-

dard relating to options to renew where the parties fail to agree
on a rent amount are inapposite.
B.

The Parties' Writings and Parol Evidence Satisfy the
Statute of Frauds.
The Utah statute of frauds requires that a lease with a

duration of more than one year must have some memorandum thereof,
in writing and signed by the party by whom the lease is to be
made.

Utah Code Ann. S 25-5-3.

It is well established that the

writing necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds need not contain all of the terms and conditions of the agreement, but rather
may

be comprised

of

several

memoranda which, taken together,
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contain the terms of the agreement.

72 Am.Jur. 2d, Statute of

Frauds, S 371; In re Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549 (Utah
1979).
In the instant case, the parties1 agreement on a rent
amount for the third 36-month period of the lease term is memorialized by the Lease (Trial Exhibit 4); the October 20, 1988, rent
check written by Standard (Trial Exhibit 17); and the December 1,
1988, rent check written by Standard (Trial Exhibit 18).

Stan-

dard argues that because English, the party to be charged, did
not sign the checks, they cannot be considered as satisfying the
writing

requirement of the statute of frauds.

However,

it is

well established that not all of the writings memorializing an
agreement

need

to

be

signed

Greqerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d

by

the

parties

369, 372-73

Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, S 371.

to

be

(Utah 1980);

charged.
72 Am.

While English did not sign

the two checks when he deposited them into his bank, it is undisputed that he did sign the 1982 Lease.
Though Standard further contends that the checks do not
contain references to the rental term, express words of reference

3

Standard's assertion in its brief that "The only way the
Lease Agreement could be enforced after August 1988 was if the
parties entered into a written addendum to the lease specifying
the amount of rent. . .," unsupported by any case authority, is
patently inaccurate. Appellant's Brief at 14.
-22-

are not required to sufficiently connect a signed writing to an
unsigned writing,

2 Corbin on Contracts, S 514 (1963).

However,

where signed and unsigned writings are relied on to satisfy the
statute of frauds, there must be some "nexus" between the writings.

Greqerson, 617 P.2d at 373.

According to the Utah Supreme

Court, this "nexus" may be shown by:
express reference in the signed writing to
the unsigned one, or by implied reference
gleamed from the contents of the writings and
the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In the latter instance, parol evidence
may be used to connect an unsigned document
to one that has been signed by the persons to
be charged.
Id.

In the instant case, the parties' written

correspondence

from July, 1988, through November, 1988, and the parties1 trial
testimony regarding their negotiations during that period, establish that the October 20, 1988, and December 1, 1988, rent checks
written by Standard referred to the Lease and memorialized the
rent amount for the third 36-month period under the lease term.
The Lease provides for all of the terms of the parties'
agreement

(e.g., ten year lease term, description of premises,

payment of maintenance expenses, taxes and insurance), except the
amount
which
Lease.
for

of the monthly

lease payment

was to be negotiated

pursuant

after September
to paragraph

1, 1988,

(c) of the

Standard's two checks sent to English indicating payment

September,

October

and part
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of

November's

lease payments

memorialize the parties1 agreement that the amount of the monthly
lease payment

after September

$1,200 to $1,000.

1, 1988, would be reduced

from

Significantly, Standard did not send English

the first post-September 1, 1988, rent check, with the check stub
notations indicating a $1000 rent amount until November 21, 1988,
approximately

three weeks after Schubach had called English at

his home and agreed on a rent amount of $1,000.

Thereafter,

Standard sent another check also in the sum of $1,000.

The rent

checks, both paid after Standard had agreed to pay $1,000 per
month

rent,

together

with

the Lease contain

all the material

terms of the parties1 agreement and thereby satisfy the statute
of frauds.
The parties' written correspondence

from July, 1988,

through November, 1988, together with the parties' oral negotiations and the circumstances of those negotiations establish the
requisite nexus between the rent checks and the Lease.
Prior to June, 1988, Standard understood that the Lease
expired at the end of August, 1988, with an option to negotiate a
renewal of the lease.

However, in a conversation on June 20,

1988, English informed Standard that the lease did not expire in
1988 and referred Standard to the Lease.

The course of the par-

ties' subsequent communications establishes that the parties were
negotiating

with

reference

to

the

-24-

amount

of

monthly

lease

payments due under the Lease for the third 36 month period after
September 1, 1988.
Memorializing

an

earlier

conversation,

English's

July 5, 1988, letter states:
Also, as we discussed, we will negotiate
a new monthly lease amount around the 15th of
September, as per the lease agreement.
Trial Exhibit 5 (emphasis added).
In his responding

letter dated July 20, 1988

(Trial

Exhibit 6), Standard did not dispute English's statement that the
parties would negotiate for a new monthly rent "as per the lease
agreement."
est

Additionally, Standard expressed a continued inter-

in "subletting]"

buyout of the lease."
premises

the premises and suggested

"an outright

Standard's suggestion that it "sublet" the

indicates that

it understood that even though

it had

vacated the premises, it continued to be bound under the lease.
Moreover, Standard's reference to a "buy out of the lease" indicates that

it understood that there must have been some lease

term to buyout which extended beyond September 1, 1988.
English's July 22, 1988 letter (Trial Exhibit 7) confirms the conclusion that the parties were negotiating in reference to the Lease and not with regard to a month to month tenancy
or a settlement agreement.

In that

letter, English responds to

Standard's suggestion that the premises be sublet by stating that
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his approval of a subtenant would not be "unreasonably withheld/'
language which echoes language contained in the Lease,
Standard's
(Trial Exhibit

next

correspondence

8), states that

dated

in September

August

1,

1988

Standard would be

negotiating for an $800 per month "lease amount."

Standard also

proposed, as it had before, a "simple buyout of our lease."

Both

statements indicate that Standard was negotiating with reference
to the Lease and that it understood that the lease term extended
beyond September 1, 1988.
In his next letter to Standard dated September 13, 1988
(Trial Exhibit 9), English expressed an interest in a meeting to
"discuss the lease negotiations" (emphasis added).
In a letter dated October 5, 1988 (Trial Exhibit 11),
English recounts the parties' inability to arrive at an "acceptable negotiated

monthly

lease payment

for

the

[sic] year period of [Standard's] lease . . ."

remaining

four

English's lan-

guage communicates his understanding that the parties were negotiating with reference to the 36-month period of the lease term
beginning after September 1, 1988.
On or about October 20, 1988, Standard sent a check to
English for $1,600.

(Trial Exhibit 16).

The check stub indi-

cated $800 for September's rent and $800 for October's.
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English

subsequently returned the check because the parties had not yet
agreed on an amount.
Thereafter,

Schubach

called

English

at his home and

agreed to $1,000 per month as the rental amount.

Approximately

three weeks after Schubach1s call to English, English received
the same $1,600 check he had previously received and sent back to
Standard, except that the notations on the check stub had been
changed to indicate a $1,000 rent payment for September

and a

partial rent payment of $600 for the month of October.

(Trial

Exhibit 17). On the same date, November 21, 1988, Standard paid
Utah Power & Light bills for electricity supplied to the premises
through October 18, 1988.
On December 5, 1988, English received from Standard a
rent check in the sum of $1,000.

On the next day, December 6,

1988, Standard paid Utah Power & Light bills for electricity supplied to the premises through November 18, 1988.
Standard's
period

statements

and

of negotiations with English

conduct

over

establish

a

that

six-month
Standard's

agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent was with reference to the
third 36-month period of the Lease.

Specifically, the parties'

references

"lease

to "lease

payments" and

negotiations,"

to

"subletting" the premises and to a possible "buyout of the lease"
evidence that Standard understood that
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it was negotiating with

reference to the Lease and that

it was bound under the Lease

beyond September lf 1988.
Moreover, there is an absence of support in the record
for the assertion that the agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent
occurred in any context other than an agreement to pay $1,000 per
month for the third 36-month period of the 1982 Lease.

At no

place in his deposition or trial testimony did Schubach assert
that Standard's agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent was not in
the context
lease.

of

the negotiations

for

a rent

amount

under

the

Additionally, Standard has pointed to no testimony of

any of the witnesses who testified at trial as support for the
conclusion that the parties were negotiating
The

written

Lease,

the

parties1

rent

for a settlement.

agreement,

the

written

checks paid pursuant to the agreement and the parties' oral negotiations and correspondence amply satisfy the statute of frauds.
Use of the statute of frauds in this case to shield Standard from
liability for a contractual obligation would promote the injustice the statute is intended to prevent.
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IV.

ENGLISH1 S ENTRANCE ONTO THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEASE.

PREMISES

DOES

NOT

PRECLUDE

In its brief, Standard argues that English breached the
Lease by unlawfully depriving Standard of possession of the premises and that English's repossession precludes him from recovering under the Lease.

The assertion that English deprived Stan-

dard of possession is unfounded.
to occupy the building.
desirable

Standard voluntarily chose not

Having found what it deemed to be a more

location, Standard voluntarily vacated

leaving signs announcing the move.

the premises,

After considering all of the

evidence, including the creditability and demeanor of the witnesses, the trial court entered findings of fact that English's
actions did not deprive Standard of access to the premises; that
each time Standard sought

access to the premises, access was

achieved; that Standard was never denied access to the premises;
and that Standard was given a key to the premises.
fact that Standard has not

challenged

Despite the

any of these findings,

Standard apparently requests this Court to rule that Standard was
unlawfully deprived of possession as a matter of law.
act upon which Standard relies as supporting
Standard

was

unlawfully

deprived
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of

The single

its position that

possession

is

English's

change of the lock on October 18, 1988.
v. Planned Management

Standard relies on Bass

Services, 761 P.2d

566

(Utah 1988), and

Aldrich v. Olson, 531 P.2d 825 (Wash. App. 1975), for the proposition that a landlord unlawfully deprives a tenant of possession
when the landlord changes the locks.

Both cases are distinguish-

able from the facts of this case.
Aldrich
involved

a

v.

Olson,

residential

531

P.2d

landlord/tenant

825

(Wash.

dispute

in

App.
which

1975)
the

plaintiff/landlord sought recovery of unpaid rent for the balance
of a lease term.

The defendant/tenant denied liability on the

grounds that there was no default under the lease and further
sought damages resulting

from the landlord's alleged eviction.

After not receiving a rent payment, the landlord had entered the
premises with a key she had retained and discovered rotten food
and that some of the tenant's property was missing, after which
she changed the locks.

Several days later, the tenant returned,

broke one of the locks, reentered the premises and removed the
rest of his property, together with some furnishings which he had
installed under the terms of the lease.

4

There is no evidence in the record that Standard raised the
issue of lack of possession or access with English until Standard
filed its Answer to the Complaint.
-30-

Affirming the trial court's decision

in favor of the

tenant, the appellate court found that the tenant had not abandoned the premises and that the landlord's change of the locks
constituted an unlawful eviction.

Aldrichr 531 P.2d at 827.

In

discussing the significance of the landlord's actions, the court
stated:
It is difficult to visualize an act of a
landlord more specifically intended as a
reassumption of possession by the landlord
and a permanent deprivation of the tenant's
possession than a "lockout" without the tenant's
knowledge
or permission
[emphasis
added].
Consequently, the real issue on
appeal is whether or not changing the locks
was an unlawful [original emphasis] act by
the landlord.
Id.

The court's language

indicates that where the tenant has

knowledge of the landlord's change of the locks or where the tenant has given the landlord permission to change the locks, the
landlord's

act of changing

the

locks might

not be considered

unlawful.
In the instant case, Standard effectively gave English
permission to change the lock.

In the parties' September 26,

1988, meeting, Standard declared that it was not in the leasing
business and that it was English who was in the leasing business.
The trial court

found that English

left the meeting with the

understanding that English was responsible for obtaining a tenant
for

the

unoccupied

premises

while
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the

parties

continued

to

negotiate a lease amount.
tenant

Standard's

for the premises necessarily

instruction to obtain a

implied

that, at the very

least, English could take those measures reasonably necessary to
obtain a tenant,

including

them to prospective tenants.

repairing

the premises

and showing

The trial court found that English

changed the lock for the purpose of protecting the tools of the
workmen who English had hired to repair the premises.
the trial court
Standard

of

found

access

Moreover,

that English's

actions did not deprive

the premises;

that

to

each

time

Standard

sought access to the premises, access was achieved; that Standard
was never denied access to the premises; and that Standard was
given a key to the premises.

Standard has not challenged any of

these findings.
Not only does Standard's authorization of English to
find a subtenant distinguish this case from the facts of Aldrich,
Standard's

authorization

also operates

to bar Standard,

under

principles of waiver and estoppel, from asserting that English's
change of the lock constituted an unlawful eviction.

To evoke

the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party (the "first party")
must show that another party made a statement inconsistent with a
claim later asserted by that party; that the first party acted in
reliance on the statement;

and that

the first party would be

injured if the second were allowed to contradict or repudiate its
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statement.

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commis-

sion, 602 P.2d

689, 694

waiver, a party must
right.

(Utah 1979).

knowingly

and

Under

the doctrine of

intentionally

relinquish a

Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 578

(Utah 1985).
In this case, Standard made the statement that it would
not continue to seek subtenants for the premises and that finding
a tenant was English's business.

English concluded from Stan-

dard's statement that it was his responsibility to obtain a tenant.

To comply with Standard's

instruction, English

employed

workmen to repair the damage done by Standard to the premises.
For

the

changed

purpose
the

unlawfully

of

lock.

protecting
Standard

deprived

the

now

workmen's

argues that

it of possession,

tools,

English

English's

despite

the

action

facts

that

Standard effectively gave English permission to enter the premises and that Standard was never deprived of possession of the
premises.

Accordingly,

Standard

is

estopped

to

claim

that

English's change of the lock constitutes an unlawful eviction.
Similarly,

Standard's

instruction

to

English

to

obtain

a

subtenant constitutes a knowing and intentional relinquishment of
Standard's right to exclusively enter the premise.
Standard also relies on Bass v. Planned Management Services,

761

P.2d

566

(Utah

1988),
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to

support

its

claim

that

English unlawfully deprived Standard of possession of the premises •

In Bass, two of the defendants, the Trimbles, leased a

mobile home to the plaintiffs, the Basses, who moved the mobile
home to a park managed by defendant Planned Management Services,
Inc. ("PMS").

After the Basses defaulted on their payments for

the mobile home, the Basses employed a real estate agent to sell
the mobile home and moved out some time around October 20, 1978,
ten days before the expiration of the lease on October 31, 1978.
Thereafter, PMS changed the locks on the mobile home and sold it
to another party.

The trial court held PMS liable for trespass

in the

$76.70, the

amount

of

reasonable

rental value

of

the

mobile for the ten day period of the trespass.
Conceding that it changed the lock prior to the expiration of the lease term, PMS asserted on appeal that the Basses
were not actually denied access to the home or that any demand to
enter after the locks were changed had been made.

In affirming

the trial court's finding, the appellate court emphasized that
the result of PMS's actions was to actually deny access to Basses1

real estate agent and that the Basses were also, in fact,

denied access to the park on at least one occasion.

Bass, 761

P.2d at 569.
While the court in Bass expressly found that the tenants

had

been

denied

access,

the
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trial

court

in

this

case

expressly found that English's actions never deprived Standard of
access to the premises*
Additionally, unlike the facts of this case, the tenant
in Bass did not authorize the landlord to enter the premises.
Standard's direction to obtain a subtenant for the Leased Premises, necessarily implied that, at the very least, English could
enter the premises to perform repairs necessary to rerent the
premises

and

to

show

the

premises

to

prospective

tenants.

Indeed, the trial court found that English changed the lock to
the premises "for the purpose of protecting

the tools of the

repairman who would be working on the premises."

In view of the

trial court's findings of fact, unchallenged an appeal, there is
an insufficient basis to conclude that English's entrance onto
the premises was unlawful.
V.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT AGAINST STANDARD FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM STANDARD'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE PREMISES.
Pursuant to the Lease, Standard agreed to at all times

maintain the premises

in a condition of good repair.

In its

findings of fact, the trial court found that Standard failed to
maintain the premises.
39-42).
that

See R. at 196-97 (Findings of Fact, 11

In its conclusions of law, the trial court concluded

Standard

breached

the

lease

by

failing

to maintain

repair the premises and awarded damages on that basis.
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and

See R. at

198 (Conclusions of Law, 11 3).

Asserting that English presented

no evidence "whatsoever" of the condition of the premises at the
commencement of the Lease, Standard argues that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that Standard
5
breached its obligations.
In making its argument, Standard
entirely overlooks the language of the Lease which unequivocally
establishes that the premises were in "good" and/or "excellent"
repair at the beginning of the lease term.

When it executed the

lease in 1982, Standard agreed, in three different places in the
lease,

to

accept

the

premises

in

"good"

and/or

"excellent"

condition:
It is mutually understood and agreed that the
premises herein leased are in a condition of
excellent repair. . . .
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2.
The lessee does hereby accepted the Leased
Premises in a condition of good repair . . .
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2.
The lessee does hereby agree to accept the
demised premises in a state of good repair
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 3.

5

As stated above, to successfully challenge any of the
findings, Standard must demonstrate that the finding is "clearly
erroneous" and "against the clear weight of the evidence." State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
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Accordingly, Standard was obligated under the Lease to
return the premises to English in at least a condition of good
repair.

The trial court found, however, that the premises were

not only

in a state of disrepair but had been badly damaged.

Standard removed attachments and cabinets and counters, leaving
gouges in the ceiling, holes in the walls and gaps in the floor
trip.

Many of the light fixtures were not working.

There was

also damage to the bathroom walls, cabinets and floor tiles.

The

furnace had not been maintained and was not working properly.
Furthermore, Standard has pointed to no evidence suggesting that
when Standard vacated

the premises, the premises were

in the

same, or better, condition than the beginning of the lease term.
Standard has failed to demonstrate that any of the trial court's
findings of fact relating to the damaged condition of the premises are clearly erroneous or that the conclusion of law relating to English's damages for repair costs is incorrect as a matter of law.
VI.

ENGLISH
APPEAL.

IS ENTITLED

TO

HIS

ATTORNEY'S

FEES

INCURRED

ON

In Management Services Corp. v. Development Assoc, 617
P.2d (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a contract provides for the payment of attorney's fees incurred in
enforcing

the contract, the prevailing party may recover both

attorney's fees incurred at the trial level and those incurred on
-37-

appeal.
v.

Management Services, 617 P. 2d at 409; see also Jenkins

Bailey,

676

P.2d

391,

393

(Utah

1984);

G.G.A.,

Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 846-47 (Utah App. 1989).

Inc.

v.

The Lease in

the instant case provides for attorneys fees and costs incurred
in enforcing the lease and was relied on by the trial court to
award

English

fees

and

costs

incurred

at

the

trial

level.

Accordingly, respondent respectfully requests that in the event
this

Court

affirms

the

trial

court's

decision,

the

case

be

remanded to the trial court for a determination of the attorney's
fees incurred by English on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, respondent

respectfully

requests that this Court affirm the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered below and remand
the case to the trial court for a determination of the attorney's
fees incurred by English on appeal.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1990.

ARY E. DOCTORMAN
ELIZABETH S. WHITi
of and for
/
PARSONS BEHLE & ^faSTIMER
Attorneys for Plaint iff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered,
four

(4)

true

and

correct

copies

of

the

foregoing

BRIEF

OF

RESPONDENT to the following on this 3rd day of December, 1990:
George A, Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

//ELIZABETH S. WHITNJ
L/ of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent

388/120290A
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ADDENDA

r
T,'..TC
F

-S

1C9Q

GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 400
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

W. DANIEL ENGLISH,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

)
)

Civil No. 89-0900580CN

)

Judge Michael R. Murphy

* * * * * * * *

This matter came for trial before the Honorable Judge
Michael R. Murphy on December 21, 1989 and continued into December

22, 1989.

Plaintiff, W. Daniel

English

("Dr.

English")

appeared in person and through his attorney, Gary E. Doctorman of
Parsons, Behle & Latimer and defendant Standard Optical Company
("Standard

Optical")

appeared

through

its

president,

Stephen

Schubach and its general manager, Klaus Rathke, and through their
attorneys, George Hunt and Kurt Frankenberg of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau.

The court having heard the testimony of the wit-

nesses

by

called

the plaintiff,

Fred

Burns, Gordon

Helstrom,
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Willard Helstrom, Dr. English and Nikkie Dore and the witnesses
called by the defendants, Stephen Schubach and Klaus Rathke, and
pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
makes the following findings of fact.
1.

On August

10, 1982, Dr. English

and Standard

Optical entered into a written Lease Agreement for the lease of
commercial real property and a building located at 3525 Market
Street, West Valley City, Utah.
2.

The significant portions of the signed written

Lease in controversy are described below:
(a) To have and to hold said premises
and office space under the terms of this
agreement for a term of ten (10) years
beginning on the first day of the month
following written notice to lessee from
lessor and terminating at midnight on the
last day of the same month 10 years hence
[i.e. 1992].
(b) The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for the demised
premises and to lessor, or order, at West
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum
of $1,000 each month for 36 months with the
first such installment to be due and payable
on or before the first day of September,
1982, and each installment payment to be due
thereafter on or before the same calendar day
during the term of the Agreement. A grace
period of five days is given for the making
of such installment payment.
(c) The monthly rent specified in the
section above shall be negotiated every 36
months.
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(d) It
is mutually
understood
and
agreed by these parties that the demised
premises herein will be used by the lessee as
a retail optical business and lessee does
hereby agree to use said premises for no
other purpose without the written consent of
lessor first had and obtained. However, such
consent will not be unreasonably withheld.
(e) It
is mutually
understood
and
agreed that the premises herein leased are in
a condition of excellent repair . . . .
(f) The Lessee does hereby agree to at
all times during the term of this agreement
keep the heating and air conditioning units
in a condition of good repair.
(g) The
Lessee
hereby
accepts
the
leased premises in a condition of good repair
and does hereby agree to at all times during
the term of this agreement to maintain the
interior of the demised premises and to keep
the same in a condition of good repair at all
times, and agrees not to make any alterations
to the demised premises without the written
consent of the lessor first had and obtained,
and then that all such alterations shall be
made at the sole expense of the Lessee and
that any such alterations as are then made a
part of or attached to the building shall
remain with the premises and become the
property of the Lessor at the end of this
lease term.
(h) The Lessee does likewise agree to
provide suitable
floor covering
(carpet,
tile, etc) of his choice in said premises, to
be responsible for all repairs done or needed
to be done to the interior of the demised
premises during the term of this agreement.
(i) The Lessee does hereby agree to be
responsible for all breakage to windows and
doors in the demised premises and not to
install any signs on the demised premises
without the permissions of the Lessor.
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(j) The Lessee shall not sublet any
portion of the leased premises without the
written consent of lessors first had and
obtained.
Nor shall the Lessee assign this
lease in whole or in part without the written
consent of the Lessors. . . .
(k) It is agreed that the Lessor will
not be liable to the lessee on account of any
damage to any property of the Lessee in the
demised premises on the count of lack of
repairs to any equipment in the demised
premises as is the responsibility of the
Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable
inspection of the demised premises at any
reasonable time during the term of this
agreement.
The Lessee does hereby agree to
at all times keep the interior of the demised
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in
accordance with all good and reasonable
standards of like commercial units.
(1) It is mutually agreed that in the
event of the failure, neglect or default of
the Lessee to make payments herein provided,
as they become due, or within the grace
period, that the Lessor shall have the right
and option to proceed under the terms of the
following provisions or either of them:
(m) To declare this agreement terminated and proceed, with or without legal
process to take possession of the demised
premises and in which event this agreement
will be terminated and each of the parties
will be excused from any further performance
of the terms and provisions herein set forth,
or
(n) To take any action necessary to
evict the Lessee from the demised premises,
and to proceed to make any and all necessary
repairs to the property and to proceed to
rent the same to any other person, and in the
event it is necessary for Lessor to take a
reduction of the rental rate on said demised
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premises that the Lessee will pay the Lessor
all
expenses,
in
connection
with
such
repairs, re-renting and any loss of rentals
as may be determined by the rates set forth
herein.
In this respect it is agreed that
time is of the essence of this agreement and
that the terms and provisions herein set
forth will extend to and become binding upon
the respective heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of these parties, and that
the Lessee shall have no right to make any
assignment of any rights under the terms of
this agreement.
(o) The Lessee does hereby agree to
turn said premises back to the Lessor at the
end of this lease term in as good a condition
as the premises are at the commencement of
this lease, with only ordinary wear and
depreciation being accepted.
(p) It is mutually agreed that in the
event it becomes necessary for either party
to enforce the terms of this agreement with
court action, after default, that the party
determined to be in default will pay to the
opposite party all court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
3.
defendant

On

entered

or

about

September

into a written

1,

1985,

addendum

plaintiff

and

to the 1982 Rental

Agreement specifying a monthly rent of $1,200 to be paid for the
36-month period beginning on September 1, 1985.
4.

In

1986

and

1987,

Standard

Optical

made

the

decision to convert their optical stores to "super stores" where
possible

and

in early 1988 began negotiations with the Valley

Fair Mall, one block away from the leased premises, and in June,
1988, executed a lease with Valley Fair Mall for a super store.
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5.

Prior

to

September,

1988, plaintiff

had

never

experienced any problems with Standard Optical promptly paying
rent.
6.

Prior

to June 1988, Standard Optical understood

the Rental Agreement term to expire at the end of August 1988,
with an option to negotiate a renewal.
7.
Standard

On June 20, 1988, Klaus Rathke, General Manager of

Optical

("Rathke")

told

Dr.

English

Optical was moving to the Valley Fair Mall.
Mr. Rathke that

that

Standard

Dr. English informed

the Lease term did not expire

in 1988.

Mr.

Rathke expressed he thought the lease term was up and Dr. English
referred him to the Lease.
8.

On or about June 30, 1988, Dr. English and Steven

Schubach ("Schubach") discussed the leased premises and Schubach
proposed to sublease the premises.
he would consider

Dr. English wrote back that

a proposal and responded

in writing

as the

Lease agreement required to consent of the Landlord.
9.

On July 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid

its July rent to Dr. English.
10.

On

July

5,

1988, Dr.

English

requested

that

Standard Optical submit a list of proposed tenants for subletting
the premises and suggested a meeting on September 15, 1988 to
negotiate a new rental amount.
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11.

July 17, 1988, was Standard Optical1s last day of

business at the leased premises.
12.

On or about July 18, 1988, Standard Optical moved

its records and inventory from the leased premises and also moved
attachments to the building and built-in-cabinets and counters.
Several large signs were placed on the premises stating Standard
Optical

had moved.

Dr. English read

the signs and concluded

Standard Optical had moved.
13.

On July 20, 1988, Schubach wrote to Dr. English

stating that Standard Optical had abandoned their plans to have a
subsidiary of Standard Optical sublet the space but wanted to
sublet it to someone else.
14.

On July 22, 1988, Dr. English wrote to Schubach

stating that he needed to know more about the proposed subtenant
before he could approve a subtenant.
15.

On August 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid

its rent for the month of August.
16.

Also on August 1, 1988, Mr. Schubach wrote to Dr.

English indicating that Standard Optical intended to negotiate
for

an $800 per month Lease beginning

September

1, 1988, and

alternatively proposing a buy-out of $4,800 to be paid on September 15, 1988.
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17.
English

met

On September
to discuss

26, 1988, Schubach, Rathke and Dr.

the

lease.

Dr.

English

document with rent comparables to Schubach.
the rent comparables.
and Layton stores.
sublease

that

presented

Schubach

a

rejected

Schubach commented about rent in his Provo

Dr. English suggested if Standard wanted to

they

should

consider

calling

Weight

Watchers.

Schubach stated "We're not in the leasing business, you are.

Our

business is the optical business."
18.

Schubach later said he would contact Rick Trentman

of Weight Watchers.
meeting

with

Dr. English

the understanding

left the September

that

Standard

Optical

26, 1988,
was not

going to use the premises as a retail optical shop and that Dr.
English, who was in the leasing business, should find a tenant
and the parties would continue to negotiate the Lease amount.
19.
understanding

On
that

September
he

was

29,
to

1988,

in

compliance

attempt

to

find

a

with

his

tenant,

Dr.

English had an access key made for the premises and upon entering
the premises to inspect it he found damage to the Premises.
20.

On October 1, 1988, Standard Optical did not pay

21.

On October 5, 1988, Dr. English sent a notice of

any rent.

default
same

to Standard Optical

Lease

amount

until

and suggested

they

agreed

and

the parties use the
that

they

use

MAI
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appraisers to determine the amount.

Dr. English did this because

he believed Schubach had used Standard Optical1s Provo and Layton
stores

as

comparisons

which

Dr.

English

believed

to

be

inappropriate.
22.

No subtenant was ever presented to Dr. English by

Standard Optical.

Further, Stephen Schubach called and left a

message for Rick Trentman but never made contact directly with
Rick Trentman of Weight Watchers.
23.

On October 18, 1988, Dr. English changed the lack

to the premises for the purpose of protecting the tools of the
repairmen who would be working on the premises.
24.

On October

20, 1988, Standard

check in the amount of $1600:
October

rent.

Optical

issued a

$800 for September and $800 for

Schubach sent this amount because

Standard Optical left the negotiations.

it was where

No mention was made that

it was in response to a Demand Letter.
25.

On October 20, 1988, Dr. English's attorney, Gary

Doctorman, wrote

a letter

Standard Optical Company.

to Richard

and

Stephen

Schubach at

The letter informed Standard Optical

that it was "in violation of the terms of the lease" and that if
it desired to "remain in possession of the leased premises," it
should

make

rent

payments

for

-9-

the

months

of

September

and

October.

The amount of rent claimed due was not specified in the

letter.
26.

Dr. English subsequently returned the $1,600 check

to Standard Optical because the parties had not yet arrived at an
agreed amount.
27.

On November 1, 1988, no payment was made.

28.

In

the

first

week

of

November,

1988, Schubach

called Dr. English at his home and agreed that Standard Optical
would pay $1,000 monthly rent.
29.

Each time Standard Optical sought access to the

property after the locks were changed, access was achieved.
30.

On or about November 7, 1988, Dr. English's office

gave the key to the premises to an employee of Standard Optical.
31.
Optical

On or about November

employees

entered

into

5 and November

the

Premises

and

7, Standard
removed

the

remaining Standard Optical possessions.
32.

Between September

1, 1988 and January

31, 1989,

Standard Optical only attempted to enter the premises on November
5, 1988 or November 7, 1988, and during the first half of October, 1988, on November 4, 1988 and on December 16, 1988.
time that Standard Optical attempted
mises

were

they

denied

access.

At no

to enter the Leased Pre-

Dr. English's

actions

never

deprived Standard Optical of access to the premises.
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33.

Sometime

before November

between

the

last

10, 1988, subcontractors

commenced repairs to the Premises.

week

of

October

and

hired by Dr. English

At that time Dr. English had

not yet arranged for any particular tenant to lease the Premises.
34.

On November 21, 1988, Dr. English received $1,600

in payment, the check markings indicated $1,000 of which was to
be applied

to the September

rent and $600 to be applied to a

partial payment for the October rent.
35.

On November 21, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah

Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525
Market Street up through October 18, 1988.
36.

On

December

1, 1988, Standard

Optical

issued a

2, 1988, Dr. English sent

a demand

check to Dr. English in the amount of $1,000.
37.
letter

to

Mr.

On December
Rathke

at

Standard

Optical

requesting

payments due for October, November and December."

"lease

In his letter,

Dr. English also indicated that he had three prospective tenants
for the premises.

On December 5, 1988, Dr. English received a

check from Standard Optical in the amount of $1,000.
38.

On December

6, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah

Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525
Market Street through November 18, 1988.
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39.
premises

at

Defendant Standard Optical failed to maintain the
all

times

in a clean

and

sanitary

condition

in

accordance with good and reasonable standards of like commercial
units.
40.

Defendant

Standard

Optical

removed

Standard

Optical

failed

attachments

from the building.
41.

Defendant

to

keep

the

furnace in a reasonable state of repair.
42.

Dr.

English

and

his

contractors'

inspection

revealed the reasonable need to repair and Dr. English did repair
at a reasonable cost as indicated as follows:
(a)

The furnace was not working properly and plumbing

was damaged and Willard Hellstrom charged $619.86 for repairs.
(b)

It

appeared

that

Standard

Optical

had

removed

numerous fixtures, including built-in-cabinets and counters.
removal

left

large and small holes

ceiling, walls, and carpets.
cabinets
failed

left
to

fix

gaps
a

in the

plumbing

The

in the walls, damaged the

Also, the removal of the built-in
trim.
leak

Additionally,
damaging

the

cabinets and left the floor tiles curling.

Standard

bathroom

had

walls,

The damage to the

walls, ceiling, bathroom trim was repaired with like materials.
The

bills

for

repairs

were:
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Gordon

Hellstrom,

$2,031.82;

0010

Butterfield

Lumber,

$366.42; Fred

Burns,

$4,143.30;

Perschon,

$113.99 and Perschon $1,472.01.
(c)
tures

Standard Optical

requiring

repair of

left behind damaged

34 lampholders,

light

replacement

of

fix120

lamps and other repairs by Willard Hellstrom totalling $1,135.26.
(d)

The

above

repairs

totalled

$9,852.66

and

Dr.

English substantially paid these amounts on or before December
31, 1988.
43.

Dr. English mitigated

his damages and

re-rented

the premises for a period of one year to Weight Watchers, Inc. at
a sum of $990.00 per month commencing the 1st day of July, 1989.
44.

Standard Optical refused to pay rent of $1,400 for

the rent due in 1988 and has paid no rent in the year 1989.
45.

Reasonable

attorneys1

fees

of

$11,968.40

were

incurred by plaintiff, and plaintiff's expenses and filing fees
of $75.00, service of process fees of $9.75 and deposition costs
of $453.45.
THE COURT HAVING MADE THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT hereby
enters its Conclusions of Law:
1.

Pursuant

to the terms of the written Lease, the

parties negotiated at the end of the second 36-month term and on
or about November 2, 1988 the parties agreed that the rent for
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the next 36-month term from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991
would be $1,000 per month.
2.

Standard Optical failed to pay the rent as agreed

and breached the written Lease.

Dr. English has been damaged in

the amount of lost rent for the year 1988 in the amount of $1,400
and for lost rent from January 1, 1989 through the 1st day of
July, 1990 in the amount of $6,000.

Plaintiff is entitled to the

entry of judgment of these amounts.
3.
Agreement
repair

Standard

between

Optical

the parties

the premises,

breached
as they

including

the

failed

the furnace,

written

Lease

to maintain
and

they

and

removed

attachments to the building and as a result of their failure to
maintain and repair, Dr. English reasonably repaired the premises
at a reasonable cost of $9,852.66.
4.

Dr. English incurred reasonable attorneys' fees in

the amount of $11,968.40 and is entitled to a judgment for that
amount.
5.

Dr. English is entitled to prejudgment interest on

the damages and lost rent at the rate of 10%.
6.

Dr. English incurred court costs in the amount of

$538.20 and is entitled to a judgment for that amount.
7.

Interest shall accrue on the judgment at the rate

of 12% from the date of the judgment.
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8.

Plaintiffs failed to meet

its burden of proof to

show defendants failed to negotiate in good faith.
9.

Pursuant

to

the decision

in Reid

v. Mutual

of

Omaha Insurance Company. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1989), this court
will impose damage awards based on past events only and does not
take into account the landlord's mitigation efforts in the future
and therefore this court retains jurisdiction of this matter and
awards only those rents that have come due as of the time of the
trial, which judgment will be immediately enforceable.

The rertts

and damages accruing after the trial may be recovered

through

supplemental proceedings for any further rents lost or damages
incurred
ongoing

imposing
duty

the duty

to mitigate.

upon
The

the

landlord

initial

to

fulfill

determination

of

its
the

tenant's liability would govern in the supplemental proceeding.
DATED this

f

day of

V£/M/JJTAU1AU

flua^M /

, 19^.

j/t

JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURP
Approved as to form:

George A. Hunt
Attorney for Defendant
Standard Optical Company
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to George A. Hunt, Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 on this

£>\

day of January, 1990:"-\

384:010290A
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GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 400
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

W. DANIEL ENGLISH,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

<3/5<44CT

vs.
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah
corporation,

Defendant.

Civil No. 89-0900580CN
Judge Michael R. Murphy

* * * * * * * *

This matter came for trial before the Honorable Michael
R. Murphy and the trial was concluded on December 22, 1989.
court having entered
and

the

court

being

The

its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
fully

informed

and

good

cause

appearing

therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That

plaintiff, Daniel W. English

is hereby granted

judgment against defendant, Standard Optical, a Utah corporation
as follows:

$17,252.66 in principal, prejudgment interest in the

amount

of

§

1,355.27,

attorneys1

11,968.40, costs of court

fees

in

the

amount

in the amount of $ 538.20.

of

$

Interest

shall accrue on this judgment at the rate of 12% from the date
hereof until paid.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

this

judgment

shall

be

augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees
expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as
shall be established by Affidavit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this judgment is enforceable
immediately.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court retains jurisdiction of this matter and awards only those damages and rents that
have come due at the time of the trial.

The rents accruing after

the trial may be recovered through supplemental proceedings for
any further rents lost or damages incurred.

However, plaintiff

is imposed with its ongoing duty to mitigate its damages.
DATED this

cJ'^day of Jonualry^ 1990 .
BY THE COURT:

V^~i

^ui/^

ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Approved as to form:

George A. Hunt
Attorney for Defendant
Standard Optical Company
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to

George A. Hunt, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place,
Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this
ary, 1990:

—

384:010290C

-3-

^

day of Janu-

A G R E Z M ^ N T
THIS AGREEMENT made and executed in duplicate this 10th day of
August, 1982 by and between W, Daniel English as party of the firs: part ard
hereinafter called the Lessor, and Standard Optical Company, of Salt Lake City
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as party of the second part and hereinafter
called the Lessee.

That in consideration of the payments hereinafter reserved to be paid
by the Lessee to the Lessor and the terms and provisions of this agreement
to be kept and performed by each party to the other, the Lessor does by
these presents hereby let and lease unto the Lessee, ~ho does hereby agree
to accept as leased property and premises and in accordance with the terms and
provisions of this agreement, the following described office space and
premises situated in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Jtah, and
more particularly described as follows:
Commercial unit one (1) in the building located at 3525 Market
Street, in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utan,
containing approximately two thousand'One hundred (2100) aquare
feet of floor space together with available parking space
allocated on percentage of total square footage each tennant
occupies of total building square footage.
To have and to hold said premises and office space under the cerns
of this agreement for a term of ten (10) years beginning on the 1st day of
the month following written notice to Lessee from Lessor, and terminating
at midnight on the last day of the same month ten years hence.
The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for : H e
demised premises and to the Lessor, or order, at West Valley City, Salt La<e
County,Utah, the sum of $1000.00 each month for 36 months with the first
such installment payment to be due and payable on or before the 1st day of
September, 1982, and each installment payment to be due thereinafter bv on
or before that same calendar day during the term of the agreement

A grace

period of five days is given for the making of any such installment pavnent.
The monthly rent specified in the section above shall be negotiated
every 36 months.

It is mutually understood and agreed by these parties that the demised
premises herein will be used by the Lessee as a retail optical business a^d
Lessee does hereby agree to use said premises for no other purposes without
the written consent of the Lessor first had and obtained, however, such cor.se:
will not be unreasonably withheld.
The Lessor does hereby agree to pay the general taxes assessed against
the property and premises herein as belongs to the Lessor during the term
of this agreement.

The Lessor does also agree to furnish and pay for water

for the leased premises and to maintain the exterior of the building in which
these leased premises are located, except the glass, which shall be the
responsibility of the Lessee and as hereinafter provided.
The Lessee does hereby agree to promptly pay the charges for gas, heat,
electric service and telephone service, and to pay the taxes assessed
against all personal property of the Lessee as may be in or on the leased
premises, during the terra of this agreement.
It is mutually understood and agreed that the premises herein leased
are in a condition of excellent repair and that the heating units and air
conditioning units, gas meters and electric neters are provided so as to
furnish seperate service to the respective tennants in this main building, and
with respect thereto it is understood and agreed that the Lessee nerein will
be responsible for the installations of the gas and electric neters and
deposits thereon in the event the same is required by such respective companies;.
The Lessee does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this agreement
keep the heating and air conditioning units in a condition of good repair.
The Lessee hereby accepts the leased premises in a condition of good
repair and does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this
agreement to maintain the interior of said demised premises and keep the sane
in a condition of good repair at all times, and agrees not to make any
alterations to the demised premises without the written consent of the Lessor
first had and obtained, and then that all such alterations shall be made at
the sole expense of the Lessee and that any such alterations as are then made
a part of or attached to tne building shall remain with the premises and becomq
the property of the T cssor at the end .o* this l-.ise ter-.

The Lessee does likewise agree to provide suitable floor covering (carpet, tila
etc) of his choice in said premises, to be responsible for all repairs dene or
needed to be done to the interior of the demised premises during the t e n of
this agreement.
It is mutually understood and agreed chat in che event the demised
premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or other causes beyond the control
of the parties herein, that the Lessor shall have the rignt and option as to
whether or not the premises and building shall be repaired or reouiit, and in
the event the Lessor elects to make the needed repairs or to rebuild that an
equitable rental adjustment will be made during such time as the repairs
or rebuilding is being done, and on completion that the regular rental
paynents will again become due and payable.

In the event the Lessor elects

not to rebuild or repair the premises, then it is agreed that the Lessor aay
declare this agreement terminated in which event both parties will be excused
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein provided.
The Lessee does hereby agree to be responsible for all breakage to
windows and doors in the demised premises and not to install any signs o~ :r.e
demised premises without the permission of the Lessor.
The Lessee does hereby agree to accept the demised premises in a state
of good repair and be responsible for all costs for the installation of t~e
equipment of the Lessee in said premises.
As a material part of the consideration for this lease, the Lessee
covenants to carry adequate liability Insurance, i.e. $100,000 - $300,000 ~n
connection with the use of occupation of the leased premises and in ccrnec:~o^
with his business practice; and the Lessee covenants to save che Lessor's
premises from any claim or suit which may arise for any injury to ar7 perseentering upon said leased premises, arising from the use of leased premises
by Lessee or the entry or exit of any patient or other person, or fror. :.Ke
failure of Lessee to keep the leased premises in a safe condition, -itn c^e
exception of negligence of Lessor.
The Lessee shall not sublet any portion of the leased prenises without
the written consent of the Lessors first had and obtained.

Nor snail tne

Lessee assign this lease in whole or in part without the written consent of
the Lessors.

Nor shall an assignment for the oenefit of creditors or to a

Lessee, be deemed an exception to the prohibition against assigning or
subletting the leased premises.

If Lessee sublets any portion of the office,

with written consent, over and above present agreed rent, then one-naif of the
sublet rental shall be added to total rent of Lessor.
It is agreed that the Lessor will not be liable to the Lessee on account
of any damage to any property of the Lessee in the demised ire-nises on
account of the lack of any repairs to any equipment in the demised premises
as is the responsibility of the Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable inspection of the demised
premises at any reasonable time during the term of this agreement.

The

Lessee does hereby agree to at all times keep the interior of the-demised
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in accordance with all'good and
reasonable standards of like commercial units.
It is mutually agreed Lhat in the event of the failure, neglect or
default of the Lessee to make payments herein provided, as they become due,
or within the grace period, that the Lessor shall have the right and option
to proceed under the terms of the following provisions, or either of tnem:
(a) To declare this agreement terminated and proceed, with or without
legal process, to take possession of the demised premises and in vhich event
this agreement will be terminated and each and both parties will be excused
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein sec forth, or
(b) To take any action necessary to evict the Lessee from Che deaised
premises, and proceed to make any and all necessary repairs to the property
and proceed to rent the same to any other person, and in the event it is
necessary for the Lessor to take a reduction in the rental rate on said
demised premises that the Lessee will pay to the Lessor, all expenses in
connection with such repairs, re^-rjritin,g and any loss of rentals aa aay be
determined by the rates set forth herein.

In this respect it is agreed that

time is of the essence of this agreement and that the terms and provisions
herein set forth will extend to and beoome binding upon the respective heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns of these parties, and that :he Lessee
shall have no right to make any assignment of any rights under the terms of
this agreement.

The Lessee does hereby agree to turn said premises back to tne Lessor at
the end of this lease term in as good a condition as the premises are ac Che
commencement of this lease, with only ordinary wear and depreciation being
excepted.
The Lessee does hereby agree that all rental charges due by the terms of
this agreement will be a first lien upon ail property of the Lessee in the
demised premises and that no part of such fixtures or personal property will
be removed from the demised premises until

all rental charges are paid.

It is mutually agreed that in the event it becomes necessary for either
party to enforce the terms of this agreement with court action, aftee default,that the party determined to be in default will pay to the opposite p'arty all
court costs and a reasonable attorneys fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said parties have hereunto placed their
signatures on the day and the year first abov^ written.

W. Daniel English
Lessor

f

LESSEE
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
Gn Che

) SS.
)
day of

/^r

, 1982,

personally

appeared

before me /£*CJC*^L^
- & / ^-^r .^ ^&«~»*rfp > c^e signer of the above i-strur.en:
who duly acknowledged to me that he executecrthe same.
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
LESSOR
STATE OF UTAH
County of S a l t Lake

)
)

SS.

On the
day of
_, 1982, personally appeared
b e f o r e me
the signer of the above instrument,
who duly acknowledged to tne chat he executed the saze.

